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Abstract
Electoral reform creates new strategic coordination incentives for voters and elites,
but endogeneity problems make such effects hard to identify. We address this issue
by investigating an extraordinary dataset, from the introduction of proportional
representation in Norway in 1919, which allows us to measure vote-shares of parties
in the pre-reform single-member districts and in the same geographic units in the
post-reform multi-member districts. The electoral reform had an immediate effect
on the fragmentation of the party system, due in part to strategic party entry. We
find, though, that another main effect of the reform was that many voters switched
between existing parties, particularly between the Liberals and Conservatives, as
the incentives for these voters to coordinate against Labor were removed by the
introduction of PR.
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Duverger (1954), economists and political scientists have
built up a substantial body of work explaining how electoral systems determine aggre-
gate political outcomes. Theoretical work has posited a number of mechanisms linking
electoral rules to individual level behavior and then to the number of parties in a coun-
try, mainly via changing strategic coordination incentives of voters and elites (Cox 1997;
2015). We also have an extensive set of empirical studies that aim to test these proposi-
tions at an aggregate level, for example by looking at the number of parties that receive
votes in a national election (e.g., Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1999; Carey
and Hix 2011). But clearly identifying the effects of the electoral system on aggregate
voting patterns is fraught with endogeneity challenges (Rodden 2009a). Cross-country
comparisons, between countries with different electoral systems, can identify some gen-
eral regularities and correlations. But, because so many factors vary between countries
in addition to the electoral rules, such as changes in the number and sizes of parties,
these patterns cannot be interpreted causally. Responding to this constraint, laboratory
studies have tried to isolate the causal effect of electoral rules on voting behavior and
strategic coordination (e.g., St-Vincent, Blais and Pilet 2016; Hix, Hortala-Vallve and
Riambau-Armet 2017).
Between the aggregate-level observational studies and the micro-level experimental
studies there is new body of research that looks at real-world election outcomes at a low
level of aggregation. The aim of this new research is to get closer to identifying the causal
mechanisms at work when electoral systems change than is usually possible with national-
level data, while claiming a higher level of external validity than can usually be inferred
from laboratory experiments. For example, Fujiwara (2011) and Bordignon, Nannicini
and Tabellini (2016) exploit regression discontinuity designs in the assignment of single-
ballot and dual-ballot plurality systems in the context of Brazilian and Italian municipal
elections, respectively. Fujiwara (2011) finds that a change from single-ballot plurality
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rule to dual-ballot reduced the vote share of the top two candidates, to the benefit of
the third placed candidate, consistent with strategic voting. Bordignon, Nannicini and
Tabellini (2016), in contrast, find no evidence of strategic voting, but strong responses by
political elites (strategic entry). Pons and Tricaud (2018) similarly exploit the disconti-
nuity generated by the qualification rule for the second round in French elections. They
find that the presence of a third candidate in the second round disproportionately harms
the candidate ideologically closest to this candidate, suggesting that voters tend to vote
expressively rather than strategically.
Our paper builds on this new generation of research, by studying how a major electoral
system reform affected strategic coordination: the introduction of proportional represen-
tation (PR) in Norway in 1919. We use a new panel data set of stable subnational
geographic units, which allows us to measure vote-shares of parties at a low level of ag-
gregation: in the pre-reform SMDs (under the initial majoritarian system), and in the
same geographic units within the larger multi-member districts (MMDs) (under the new
proportional system) (Cox, Fiva and Smith 2016). With data for multiple elections before
and after the PR reform we can investigate whether secular trends threaten the validity
of our research design.
Electoral reform in Norway is a case of a more general phenomenon, as a large number
of countries in Europe moved from single-member district electoral systems to PR in the
first two decades of the 20th century. In addition, the particular political environment in
Norway at that time means that it is a very good case for seeking to isolate the effects
of electoral reform. The franchise had been extended some years before 1919: with
full suffrage extended to all men in 1898 and all women in 1913. Also, even before the
adoption of PR, Norway had a stable multiparty system, where the parties existing before
the reform all existed afterwards. Cox, Fiva and Smith (2016) use the 1919 Norwegian
reform to study voter mobilization under different electoral rules. In line with theories of
elite mobilization, they find a substantial contraction effect in the distribution of voter
turnout rates following the adoption of PR. In this paper, we study how the PR reform
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affected strategic entry, voter coordination, and the fragmentation of the party system.
Duverger (1954, p.252) and others have pointed out that the adoption of PR in Norway
led to an increase in the number of parties. Indeed, we show that the introduction of PR
led to a step-change increase in the effective number of parties of about one; mainly due
to the strategic entry of a new party (The Farmers Party, formally established in 1920).
This change in the number of parties happened immediately after the election, rather
than developing over several elections. This finding challenges the conventional view that
the effects of electoral system reforms take a long time to play out (Renwick 2018).
In our main analysis, we identify how the electoral system reform shaped voting be-
havior using election outcomes in the same geographic units in all elections between 1909
and 1927. With this research design we believe we can isolate strategic coordination
between existing parties. Following the standard theoretical understanding of strategic
coordination, we expect the lower incentive to vote strategically under PR to lead to more
votes for parties that were not competitive in 1918. We find precisely this dynamic, par-
ticularly for the Conservatives and Liberals, where voters changed how they coordinated
between these two parties.
2 Electoral context
After the dissolution of the union with Sweden (1905), elections to the Norwegian Par-
liament (Storting) were decided by a two-round runoff system. The system worked as
follows. In the first round, a candidate was elected if he received an absolute majority of
votes cast in the district. If no candidate received an absolute majority in the first round,
a second round was held within a few weeks. In the second round, candidates could enter
even if they had not run in the first round.
The first formal political parties were established two decades before the dissolution
with Sweden: the Liberals (Venstre) and the Conservatives (Høyre) in 1884, and the
Labor Party (Arbeiderpartiet) in 1887. However, up until the 1909 election, the party
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system was in a state of flux (Helland and Saglie 2003). From the 1909 election onwards,
three party ‘blocs’ dominated: the Labor Party; the Liberals and the Labor Democrats
(Arbeiderdemokratene; est. 1906); and the Conservatives and the Progressive Liberals
(Frisinnede Venstre; est. 1909). Various other minor parties and organizations also
fielded candidates in the runoff period, including the Norwegian Agrarian Association
(Norsk Landmandsforbund ; later Norges Bondelag ; est. 1896).
In the first decades of the 20th century, the Storting agenda was dominated by dis-
cussions concerning the primary industry, military budgets, educational reforms, and
infrastructure expansions (especially by rail) (Høyland and Søyland 2019). Class antag-
onisms were acute in this period and the labor movement was hostile to the bourgeois
society (Helland and Saglie 2003).
With the expansion of the franchise, support for the Labor Party substantially in-
creased. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the vote-shares and seat-shares for the three dom-
inant and a residual ‘other’ category over the 1909-1927 period. The two-round runoff
system led to a systematic underrepresentation of the Labor Party. This came mostly to
the advantage of the Liberals, who formed a single-party government from 1913 to 1920.
The Liberal Party mainly represented rural interests against the interests of the urban
Conservative establishment. The Liberals were also social reformers, though, introducing
early welfare state reforms when in government, which extended their appeal to lower
income rural voters after universal suffrage. Nonetheless, the Liberals shared strategic in-
terests with the Conservatives, in a common ‘bourgeois bloc’ against the growing support
for Labor amongst the industrial working class (Valen and Rokkan 1974).
In July 1917, parliament appointed a commission to consider changes in the elec-
toral system. This commission presented its reform proposals in April 1919. Finally, in
November 1919, MPs voted on five alternative reform proposals. A system of closed-list
PR in MMDs obtained the necessary 2/3 majority (Cox, Fiva and Smith 2019). The
new electoral system, effective from the 1921 election, grouped old SMDs into 29 MMDs
with a magnitude varying from 3 to 8 seats. The total number of seats in the Storting
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increased from 126 to 150. The seat allocation method chosen was the D’Hondt formula,
which tends to be favorable to larger parties in smaller-magnitude districts.
The conventional wisdom holds that the adoption of PR in many European democ-
racies in the early 1900s came about as a strategic effort by bourgeois parties to preserve
political power (Rokkan 1970; Boix 1999).1 However, there are many cases where PR
reforms “did not help old elites to maximize their seat shares” Calvo (2009, p. 256). In
the case of Norway, the Liberals dominated in parliament under the runoff system, but
received only about a quarter of the seats after the adoption of PR. Rodden (2009b, p. 2)
points out that the Rokkan-Boix argument “has always had an uncomfortable relationship
with certain facts. Above all, as a bulwark against the left, proportional representation
can only be viewed as a colossal failure”.
Leemann and Mares (2014) provides a reformulation of the Rokkan-Boix theory: they
argue that PR is introduced when legislators face strong district-level competition and
when their parties expect to gain seats from a change of the electoral law. Using data from
Germany, they find support for this revised hypothesis. In the case of Norway, Cox, Fiva
and Smith (2019) similarly find that the district-level electoral threat facing individual
legislators explain roll-call votes concerning PR adoption. They also emphasize how PR
affected party leaders’ control over nominations, thereby enabling them to discipline their
followers and build more cohesive parties, and find empirically that party leaders were
more likely to vote in favor of PR adoption than rank-and-file members.2
After the introduction of PR, the Norwegian Agrarian Association decided to form
the Farmers Party (Bondepartiet ; later Senterpartiet) at the June 1920 national congress
of the association; in other words only six months after the electoral reform bill had
passed through parliament.3 In 1918, the association fielded candidates in approximately
1In the case of Norway, Rokkan (1970, p. 158) argued that for Liberal MPs “the decisive motive was
clearly not a sense of equalitarian justice but the fear of rapid decline with further Labor advances across
the majority threshold”.
2In a related study, Høyland and Søyland (2019) find that the PR reform shifted the focus of speeches
from individual MPs to parties.
3Key players in the organization believed the electoral rules cleared the way for the establishment of a
political party (Aasland 1974, p. 230-231). Johan E. Mellbye, a former Conservative cabinet member and
the first leader of the Farmers Party, put it this way in a 1921 speech: “The new electoral rules was very
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20% of the single-member districts and won 3 seats.4 In the 1921 election, after the
introduction of PR and the formal establishment of the Farmers Party, they presented
lists of candidates in about 80% of the multi-member districts and won 17 seats.
There was also a change within the Labor bloc. Following the 1917 Russian Revolution
and the establishment of the Communist International in 1919, the Labor bloc in Norway
split between supporters of Communist revolution and supporters of a parliamentary road
to Socialism. Initially, the Norwegian Labor Party joined the Communist International,
which led to the formation of the Social Democratic Labor Party (NSA) in 1921, as
a breakaway on the right of the party.5 These changes within the Labor bloc were
driven more by external events than electoral reform in Norway. Nonetheless, without the
electoral reform, it is unlikely that the NSA and DNA would both have stood candidates
throughout the country.
3 Political fragmentation before and after reform
Following Cox, Fiva and Smith (2016) we construct a balanced panel data set of 91
‘SMDs’ covering the elections between 1909 and 1927, which is a total of 637 observa-
tions.6 Based on this data, Appendix Figure A.2 documents a step-change increase in
the ‘effective’ number of parties (ENoP) following the electoral reform, suggesting that
important... we have seen — in particular in the last two year — how the key idea of parliamentarism
with two parties, where one party should criticize and control the other, no longer applies. We do not
have two, but five our six parties.” (Aasland 1974, p. 231, paraphrased from Norwegian).
4The south-eastern part of Norway constituted the geographical strong-hold of the association
(Aasland, 1974, p. 67). In the rural areas of Hedemark and Opland, the association fielded a can-
didate in five out of eleven single-member districts in 1918.
5Later, when the DNA withdrew from the Communist International in 1923, the Norwegian Com-
munist Party (NKP) formed on the left of the DNA and remained a member of the International.
Following this new split and the fact that the DNA had abandoned the Communist International, the
DNA re-merged with the NSA.
6In the last pre-reform election, there were 126 SMDs. Because post-reform data only exist at the
municipality level, we are forced to drop SMDs that were located within the largest municipalities (19
SMDs). We also drop SMDs that experienced boundary changes in the 1909-1918 period (13 SMDs)
and SMDs that were not nested within a post-reform MMD (3 SMDs). This leaves us with 91 SMDs.
Appendix Table A.1 compares our estimation sample to the 126 SMDs existing in the last election before
the electoral reform. Naturally, after dropping the largest cities, the fraction of urban districts is lower
than the 1/3 stipulated by the electoral law, but otherwise our data set is quite representative.
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the fragmentation of the party system was immediate in Norway in the 1921 election.
In Appendix Table A.2 we analyze how ENoP changed with the introduction of PR
when adding (district-level) controls for the Farmers Party, the Social Democratic Labor
Party, and the Communist Party. The lack of any clear relationship between PR and
ENoP when flexibly controlling for party entry via fixed effects (column 5 in Appendix
Table A.2) suggests that voters were unresponsive to the new electoral rules. Yet, we
consider estimates reported in Appendix Table A.2 to be lower bounds on how far PR
affected voter behavior. These are lower bounds because not only do parties act strategi-
cally to decide whether to form overall, they also target their resources strategically, by
deciding to stand in districts where they have the highest opportunity of winning seats.
We therefore proceed with a sharper empirical test in the next section.
4 Strategic coordination between existing blocs
To isolate strategic switching between existing parties we restrict the panel data set to
‘SMDs’ where the three dominating blocs participated in all election years; 42 out of
91 SMDs fulfill this criterion.7 This essentially limits the sample to SMDs where all
party blocs ran every year before the reform.8 Restricting the sample in this way is useful
because it allows us to isolate shifts in the distribution of votes between these party blocs,
while holding the number of blocs participating constant.
In this analysis, we are interested in how the electoral system reform affected the
relative vote-shares of the three main parties. For example, if voters coordinated between
the Liberals and Conservatives before the reform, we should expect Liberal votes to go
down in places where they were stronger than the Conservatives and up where they
were weaker than the Conservatives. To identify these effects we define the pre-reform
advantage of party i over party j to be V S
i
−V Sj
V Si+V Sj
, where V S denotes party vote-shares.
7In this estimation sample, the effective number of parties is 2.59, while it is 2.35 in the aggregate
(Appendix Table A.1).
8There are 43 SMDs where all party blocs competed in every pre-reform election. With one exception
(Opland fylke district in 1927), these are all contested by the main party blocs post-reform.
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Because of what we know about the political positions of the three main party blocs
- where the Conservatives are on the right, Labor are on the left, and the Liberals
are between the other two blocs but much closer to the Conservatives - we expect the
electoral system reform to have a bigger effect on vote-trading between the Liberal and
Conservative blocs than between the Liberal and Labor blocs, and limited vote-trading
between the Labor and Conservative blocs.
As discussed, the ‘bourgeois’ parties (the Conservatives and Liberals) shared common
interests against the rising electoral support for Labor. Before PR, these two blocs
had incentives to coordinate to defeat Labor candidates. As a result, in districts where
the Liberals were not competitive, Liberal voters should strategically have supported
Conservatives, and vice versa. Then, with the introduction of PR, and the lower electoral
thresholds that resulted, these coordination incentives were reduced. As a result, Liberal
voters who had previously voted Conservative could now support the Liberals, while
Conservative voters who had previously supported the Liberals could now support the
Conservatives, without these choices affecting the overall electoral fortunes of these two
parties relative to Labor.
This is exactly what specification (1) and (3) from Table 1 show. We illustrate this
key result in panel (1) and (3) of Figure 1. Overall, the vote-share of the Liberals fell
between 1918 and 1921, as some of their voters switched to the Farmers Party, which
had decided to stand candidates in most districts. The Farmers and the Liberal were
now both competing for rural interests. However, in districts where the Conservatives
were well ahead of the Liberals in 1918, such as in District A, the Liberal vote rose in
1921 (relative to the average), while in districts where the Liberals were well ahead of
Conservatives in 1918, such as in District B, the Liberal vote fell in 1921.9
9District A in Figure 1 is Nordland city district. Appendix Figure A.4 displays 1918 vote counts for
this district. It seems plausible that before the reform, many Liberal voters in this district strategically
supported the Conservative candidate to keep Labor out. After the introduction of PR, the incentive
to vote strategically was weakened, and the Liberal vote-share was expected to increase in this district
(relative to the average), which is exactly what we find. District B in Figure 1 is Nordland 2nd rural
district. Appendix Figure A.5 displays 1918 vote counts for this district. Here, in the pre-reform period,
Conservative voters had an incentive to vote strategically for the Liberal candidate to keep Labor out,
and the Conservative vote-share was expected to increase in 1921, which is again what we find.
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Column (1) of Table 1 shows that 52% of the variation in ∆V SLIB is explained by
variation in the pre-reform Liberal advantage. A one standard deviation increase in the
pre-reform Liberal advantage over the Conservatives (0.51) is associated with an eight
percentage point reduction in the Liberal vote-share. Such a fall in the Liberal vote-
share appears to have benefited the Conservatives and the Farmers Party in about equal
proportions (column (3) and (4)), while leaving Labor vote-shares roughly unaltered
(column (2)).
In columns (5)-(8) of Table 1 we analyze how the Liberal advantage over Labor cor-
relates with vote-share changes pre- and post-reform. Again, we see that a large Liberal
advantage is associated with a fall in the Liberal vote-share, but it seems that these votes
were captured by the newly established Farmers Party, and not the Labor bloc.
In columns (9)-(12) of Table 1 we analyze how the Labor advantage over Conserva-
tives correlates with vote-share changes pre- and post-reform. Here, the results shows
that Labor tended to lose votes the stronger their (pre-reform) advantage over the Con-
servatives was (column 10), while the opposite is true for the Conservatives (column 11).
Puzzlingly, we find that the Liberals tended to lose out when Labor had an advantage
over the Conservatives (column 9). This unexpected correlation may be driven by the
fact that in districts where Labor had an advantage over the Conservatives, then typically
a similar advantage existed for the Liberals over the Conservatives.
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Figure 1: Vote-trading between blocs between 1918 and 1921
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Note: The scatterplots and fitted lines correspond to specification (1), (2), (3), and (4) of Table 1.
The y-axes measure the percentage point change in vote-share for the four different blocs between 1918
and 1921. The x-axes measure the Liberal advantage over the Conservatives in 1918. In the pre-reform
period we use first round vote-shares. The sample is restricted to ‘SMDs’ where the three dominating blocs
are participating in all election years. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals based on robust
standard errors. We highlight two example districts: Nordland city district (District A) and Nordland
county 2nd district (District B).
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Table 1: Vote-trading between blocs between 1918 and 1921
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆V SLIB ∆V SLAB ∆V SCON ∆V SOTH ∆V SLIB ∆V SLAB ∆V SCON ∆V SOTH ∆V SLIB ∆V SLAB ∆V SCON ∆V SOTH
Pre-reform V S
LIB
−V SCON
V SLIB+V SCON
-0.152 -0.025 0.086 0.091
(0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.032)
[0.019] [0.015] [0.034] [0.031]
Pre-reform V S
LIB
−V SLAB
V SLIB+V SLAB
-0.132 0.007 0.025 0.100
(0.033) (0.019) (0.033) (0.037)
[0.036] [0.019] [0.036] [0.040]
Pre-reform V S
LAB
−V SCON
V SLAB+V SCON
-0.105 -0.066 0.149 0.022
(0.029) (0.022) (0.033) (0.043)
[0.030] [0.021] [0.035] [0.044]
Constant -0.117 -0.006 -0.018 0.141 -0.113 -0.003 -0.025 0.140 -0.103 -0.005 -0.023 0.131
(0.013) (0.010) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.022)
[0.015] [0.006] [0.022] [0.023] [0.018] [0.007] [0.023] [0.023] [0.015] [0.007] [0.021] [0.024]
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
R2 0.517 0.045 0.126 0.110 0.310 0.003 0.008 0.105 0.121 0.151 0.183 0.003
Note: The dependent variables are percentage point change in the vote-share from 1918 to 1921 for the bloc given in the header. The sample is restricted
to ‘SMDs’ where the three dominating blocs are participating in all election years (N=42). In the pre-reform period we use first round vote-shares.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Cluster-robust standard errors based on the post-reform district level in brackets (18 clusters).
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Strategic entry cannot drive our findings in Table 1 since our sample is restricted
to cases where the relevant blocs participated in all election years. What about other
elite-level explanations? For example, one could imagine that after the introduction of
PR, parties might start to nominate better candidates in districts in which they were
previously uncompetitive, and this might be driving the decisions of voters to switch
their votes (see also Becher 2016).10 To address this concern, we use candidate-level
occupation data from the Fiva and Smith (2017) dataset. Appendix Figure A.6 shows
how the share of white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, farmers, and a residual other
category, evolved over the 1909-1927 period by party bloc. For the Labor bloc, there
is some indication that the introduction of PR led to an increase in the share of blue-
collar candidates. For the Liberal and Conservative blocs the share of candidates from
the four occupational groups are stable over the sample period. Still, this could mask
across-district heterogeneity in the composition of candidates that potentially change
with the PR reform. We therefore include a set of controls at the district-bloc level to
our regression framework. Appendix Table A.3 provides the results. Even though the
R2 increase substantially in some specifications, the coefficients of interest do not change
much, suggesting that elite-level adjustments are not driving the findings in Table 1.11
As a placebo test, we look at vote-share changes as a function of the (lagged) Liberal
advantage over Conservatives in non-reform years. Figure 2 shows these results (Panel
A, B, C, E, and F) along with the actual reform analysis (Panel D). We observe that the
reform year stands out when compared to the non-reform years. In non-reform years there
is no clear systematic pattern between the (lagged) Liberal advantage over Conservatives
and the vote-shares of these blocs.12
10A residency requirement, effective both before and after the introduction of PR, limits parties scope
for strategic resource allocation (Fiva and Smith 2017). They could not, for example, move their best
candidates to districts in which they stand a chance of competing for victory while relegating the weaker
ones to other districts.
11Controlling for pre-reform voter turnout also does not change our main results in any substantial
way (Appendix Table A.4).
12Appendix Figure A.7 and A.8 provides placebo checks corresponding to specification (5)-(8) and
(9)-(12) of Table 1, respectively.
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Figure 2: Vote-trading in reform and non-reform years
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E: Non-reform 1924
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Note: The scatterplots and fitted lines correspond to specification (1), (2), (3), and (4) of Table 1. The
y-axes measure the percentage point change in vote-share from year t-3 to year t for the bloc given in the
title of the sub-panel. The x-axes measure the Liberal advantage over the Conservatives in year t-3. In
the pre-reform period we use first round vote-shares. The sample is restricted to ‘SMDs’ where the three
dominating blocs are participating in all election years. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals
based on robust standard errors.
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5 Conclusion
Existing theories suggest that moving from a majoritarian to a proportional electoral
system should affect how voters and parties strategically coordinate. Whereas under a
majoritarian system some voters have incentives to vote for their second or third most-
preferred party, to prevent an even less-preferred party from winning a seat, under PR
these same voters should now be able to vote for their most-preferred party if they expect
it to be competitive in a district where the party was not previously competitive.
We find exactly this effect in Norway between 1918 and 1921. The introduction of
PR led to an immediate increase in the effective number of parties, measured at the
pre-reform SMD level, of approximately one. This shift was mainly due to the Farmers
Party deciding to stand candidates in more districts, knowing that it would have a better
chance of winning seats under PR than under the previous two-round system. Neverthe-
less, controlling for the number of parties standing before and after the reform, we also
identified vote-switching between the three main party blocs. In particular, the introduc-
tion of PR reduced the incentives for Conservative and Liberal supporters to coordinate
to ‘keep Labor out’. This change in strategic incentives led to a reduction in support for
the Conservatives in districts where they were ahead of the Liberals before the reform,
and a reduction in support for the Liberals in districts where they were ahead of the
Conservatives – although overall the Conservatives benefitted more from the reform than
the Liberals. What is perhaps surprising is how quickly this coordination took place, as
we only observe these changes between 1918 and 1921.
Our findings raise some interesting questions for future research on the transition to
PR in the early 20th century, such as whether the speed of voter adaptation is unique
to the Norwegian case or is generalizable to other cases, or whether Conservatives or
Liberals benefitted more from the new strategic environment. On the one hand, the
structure of the party system in Norway prior to suffrage extension and the introduction
of PR and the level of economic development was similar to many Northern European
15
countries, which suggests that the result might be generalizable to other cases. On the
other hand, the speed of this adaptation to the new strategic context might be unique to
the Norwegian case, or at least specific to Scandinavian countries, where Conservatives
and Liberals were traditionally more divided along urban-rural lines than along class
lines, which might have made voter coordination easier.
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Figure A.1: Vote-shares and seat-shares across blocs
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
1909 1912 1915 1918 1921 1924 1927
Labor
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
1909 1912 1915 1918 1921 1924 1927
Liberals
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
1909 1912 1915 1918 1921 1924 1927
Conservatives
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
1909 1912 1915 1918 1921 1924 1927
Other
Vote-shares Seat-shares
Note: The figure shows national vote-shares (white) and seat-shares (black) for the four political blocs
over the 1909 to 1927 period. The introduction of PR is marked with the dashed vertical line. The Social
Democratic Labor Party of Norway, which ran in the 1921 and 1924 elections, and the Communist Party,
which entered the political arena in 1924, are included in the Labor Party bloc. In the pre-reform period,
vote-shares based on the first round are reported.
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Figure A.2: The (effective) number of parties before and after PR
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Note: The figure shows the average number of (effective) parties in each election by post-reform district
magnitude. Two-round elections were used from 1909-1918, and proportional representation from 1921-
1927. In the pre-reform period, we report the effective number of parties based on both first (white) and
final (gray) round vote-shares. The data set is based on the pre-reform district structure.
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Figure A.3: Fraction of SMDs Contested by Party
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Note: The sample is restricted as in our baseline (see Appendix Table A.1).
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Figure A.4: Example of pre-reform vote counts: Nordland city district
Note: Example comes from the 1918 election in Bodøand Narvik, the City District in Nordland County,
which is labelled ‘District A’ in Figure 1. V = Liberals, S = Labor Party, H = Conservatives, FV
= Progressive Liberals. The excerpt is from Haffner, Vilhelm and P. A. Wessel-Berg (1919).
Stortingsvalget 1918. Vol. 150 Kristiania: Aschehoug and Co.
5
Figure A.5: Example of pre-reform vote counts: Nordland county 2nd district
Note: Example comes from the 1918 election in Nordre Helgeland, the 2nd District in Nordland County,
which is labelled ‘District B’ in Figure 1. V = Liberals, S = Labor Party, H = Conservatives, FV
= Progressive Liberals. The excerpt is from Haffner, Vilhelm and P. A. Wessel-Berg (1919).
Stortingsvalget 1918. Vol. 150 Kristiania: Aschehoug and Co.
6
Figure A.6: Candidates’ occupational background by party bloc over time
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Note: The figure shows, for each bloc, the nation-wide fraction of candidates belonging to four different
occupation categories: white-collar workers (ISCO codes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5); farmers (ISCO code 6);
blue-collar workers (ISCO codes 7, 8, and 9); and a residual “other” category (including armed forces
[ISCO code 10], housewives, students, and pensioners). We use candidates’ first-listed occupation on the
ballot (if more than one occupation is listed). Data from Fiva and Smith (2017) (N=5055).
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Figure A.7: Vote-trading in reform and non-reform years: Liberal advantage over Labor
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Note: The scatterplots and fitted lines correspond to specification (5), (6), (7), and (8) of Table 1. The
y-axes measure the percentage point change in vote-share from year t-3 to year t for the bloc given in the
title of the sub-panel. The x-axes measure the Liberal advantage over Labor in year t-3. In the pre-reform
period we use first round vote-shares. The sample is restricted to ‘SMDs’ where the three dominating
blocs are participating in all election years. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals based on
robust standard errors.
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Figure A.8: Vote-trading in reform and non-reform years: Labor advantage over Conser-
vatives
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Note: The scatterplots and fitted lines correspond to specification (9), (10), (11), and (12) of Table 1.
The y-axes measure the percentage point change in vote-share from year t-3 to year t for the bloc given in
the title of the sub-panel. The x-axes measure the Labor advantage over the Conservative in year t-3. In
the pre-reform period we use first round vote-shares. The sample is restricted to ‘SMDs’ where the three
dominating blocs are participating in all election years. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals
based on robust standard errors.
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Figure A.9: Vote-shares across blocs, split by top-two status 1918
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Note: The figure shows the vote-shares across blocs, split by top-two status in 1918. In the pre-reform
period we use first round vote-shares. The sample is restricted to ‘SMDs’ where the three dominating
blocs are participating in all election years.
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Figure A.10: Pre-reform partisan advantage and voter turnout
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Note: The top panel plots voter turnout in 1918 against three measures of pre-reform partisan advantage.
The bottom panel plots voter turnout in 1921 against the same three measures of pre-reform partisan
advantage. The sample is restricted to ‘SMDs’ where the three dominating blocs are participating in all
election years.
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Table A.1: Description of estimation samples using data from the 1918 election
(1) (2) (3)
All Estimation sample 1 Estimation sample 2
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Urban district 0.33 (0.47) 0.21 (0.41) 0.31 (0.47)
Voteshare LAB 0.29 (0.16) 0.28 (0.14) 0.33 (0.12)
Voteshare LIB 0.37 (0.25) 0.40 (0.23) 0.30 (0.18)
Voteshare CON 0.27 (0.23) 0.25 (0.22) 0.36 (0.16)
Voteshare OTH 0.06 (0.13) 0.07 (0.14) 0.01 (0.04)
ENoP1 2.35 (0.54) 2.44 (0.54) 2.59 (0.43)
Second round 0.55 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 0.64 (0.48)
Post-reform magnitude 5.57 (1.42) 5.49 (1.42) 5.17 (1.34)
N 126 91 42
Note: This table compares the estimation samples to the 126 SMDs existing in the last election before the
electoral reform. In estimation sample 1, we drop SMDs that were located within the largest municipali-
ties, SMDs that experienced boundary changes in the 1909-1918 period, and SMDs that were not nested
within a post-reform MMD. Estimation sample 2 further restricts the sample to ‘SMDs’ where the three
dominating blocs are participating in all election years.
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Table A.2: Aggregate level analysis of how electoral reform impacts ENoP
Panel A: First round
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proportional Representation 0.896 0.517 0.357 0.264 0.054
(0.067) (0.097) (0.104) (0.110) (0.085)
[0.114] [0.137] [0.158] [0.169] [0.124]
Farmers Party 0.548 0.557 0.564 0.700
(0.102) (0.103) (0.102) (0.079)
[0.153] [0.154] [0.153] [0.106]
Social Democratic Labor Party 0.250 0.276 0.266
(0.071) (0.074) (0.069)
[0.105] [0.114] [0.114]
Communist Party 0.129 0.188
(0.055) (0.052)
[0.072] [0.074]
N 637 637 637 637 637
R2 0.446 0.492 0.506 0.510 0.676
SMD fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party fixed effects No No No No Yes
Panel B: Final round
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proportional Representation 1.172 0.809 0.638 0.548 0.177
(0.061) (0.084) (0.091) (0.097) (0.082)
[0.102] [0.115] [0.136] [0.150] [0.128]
Farmers Party 0.524 0.534 0.540 0.669
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.071)
[0.128] [0.128] [0.128] [0.091]
Social Democratic Labor Party 0.266 0.291 0.256
(0.071) (0.074) (0.069)
[0.106] [0.114] [0.116]
Communist Party 0.126 0.194
(0.051) (0.051)
[0.068] [0.073]
N 637 637 637 637 637
R2 0.621 0.655 0.668 0.671 0.754
SMD fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party fixed effects No No No No Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the effective number of parties (ENoP) measured at the pre-reform
district structure. Two-round elections were used from 1909-1918, and proportional representation from
1921-1927. In panel A, we measure ENoP using first round vote-shares. In panel B, we measure ENoP
using final round vote-shares. Cluster-robust standard errors based on the pre-reform district level in
parentheses (91 clusters). Cluster-robust standard errors based on the post-reform district level in brackets
(22 clusters). 13
Table A.3: Vote-trading between blocs between 1918 and 1921: Regression analysis when
controlling for changes in candidate occupations at the district-bloc level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆V SLIB ∆V SLAB ∆V SCON ∆V SOTH ∆V SLIB ∆V SLAB ∆V SCON ∆V SOTH ∆V SLIB ∆V SLAB ∆V SCON ∆V SOTH
Pre-reform V S
LIB
−V SCON
V SLIB+V SCON
-0.152 -0.024 0.102 0.074
(0.024) (0.025) (0.047) (0.041)
Pre-reform V S
LIB
−V SLAB
V SLIB+V SLAB
-0.128 0.011 0.016 0.101
(0.029) (0.023) (0.041) (0.035)
Pre-reform V S
LAB
−V SCON
V SLAB+V SCON
-0.066 -0.059 0.160 -0.035
(0.043) (0.028) (0.049) (0.046)
∆ White-collar CON -0.050 -0.015 -0.041 0.106 -0.125 -0.035 0.026 0.133 -0.130 -0.009 -0.032 0.172
(0.038) (0.044) (0.072) (0.059) (0.039) (0.035) (0.053) (0.047) (0.056) (0.036) (0.055) (0.063)
∆ White-collar LAB -0.164 0.103 -0.495 0.557 -0.084 0.041 -0.385 0.427 -0.419 0.039 -0.269 0.649
(0.241) (0.149) (0.413) (0.429) (0.376) (0.165) (0.504) (0.434) (0.393) (0.132) (0.369) (0.456)
∆ White-collar LIB -0.060 -0.041 -0.081 0.182 -0.085 -0.045 -0.064 0.195 -0.073 -0.035 -0.091 0.200
(0.029) (0.043) (0.101) (0.111) (0.038) (0.040) (0.091) (0.118) (0.043) (0.039) (0.110) (0.123)
∆ Blue-collar CON -0.010 -0.033 0.218 -0.176 0.075 -0.115 0.372 -0.332 -0.378 -0.139 0.580 -0.063
(0.319) (0.326) (0.495) (0.516) (0.397) (0.365) (0.543) (0.487) (0.423) (0.328) (0.422) (0.524)
∆ Blue-collar LAB -0.188 0.075 -0.457 0.570 -0.125 0.010 -0.332 0.447 -0.458 0.015 -0.233 0.677
(0.243) (0.155) (0.444) (0.465) (0.373) (0.173) (0.529) (0.468) (0.385) (0.136) (0.406) (0.483)
∆ Blue-collar LIB 0.031 -0.072 -0.086 0.127 -0.015 -0.085 -0.043 0.143 -0.011 -0.059 -0.104 0.174
(0.057) (0.044) (0.100) (0.131) (0.067) (0.048) (0.095) (0.124) (0.099) (0.046) (0.108) (0.148)
∆ Farmers CON 0.015 -0.010 -0.012 0.008 -0.007 -0.019 0.014 0.011 -0.027 -0.014 0.009 0.032
(0.039) (0.041) (0.066) (0.058) (0.038) (0.033) (0.055) (0.055) (0.046) (0.033) (0.047) (0.055)
∆ Farmers LAB -0.160 0.126 -0.535 0.569 -0.089 0.054 -0.397 0.433 -0.462 0.055 -0.277 0.684
(0.247) (0.158) (0.433) (0.451) (0.383) (0.178) (0.530) (0.456) (0.391) (0.140) (0.389) (0.466)
∆ Farmers LIB -0.148 -0.017 -0.110 0.274 -0.164 -0.011 -0.116 0.291 -0.122 -0.006 -0.143 0.271
(0.039) (0.045) (0.088) (0.094) (0.052) (0.043) (0.087) (0.102) (0.062) (0.042) (0.093) (0.106)
Constant -0.105 -0.004 -0.033 0.142 -0.100 -0.002 -0.039 0.141 -0.097 -0.004 -0.035 0.136
(0.013) (0.012) (0.029) (0.033) (0.015) (0.012) (0.031) (0.033) (0.017) (0.012) (0.029) (0.034)
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
R2 0.676 0.156 0.228 0.299 0.560 0.135 0.116 0.333 0.377 0.228 0.285 0.258
Note: The dependent variables are percentage point change in the vote-share from 1918 to 1921 for
the bloc given in the header. We include control variables for the change in the shares of candidates
from each bloc that are white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, and farmers, respectively, based on the
ISCO codes of the Fiva and Smith (2017) data set. The sample is restricted to ‘SMDs’ where the three
dominating blocs are participating in all election years (N=42). In the pre-reform period we use first
round vote-shares. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.4: Vote-trading between blocs between 1918 and 1921: Regression analysis when
controlling for pre-reform voter turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆V SLIB ∆V SLAB ∆V SCON ∆V SOTH ∆V SLIB ∆V SLAB ∆V SCON ∆V SOTH ∆V SLIB ∆V SLAB ∆V SCON ∆V SOTH
Pre-reform V S
LIB
−V SCON
V SLIB+V SCON
-0.136 -0.019 0.094 0.061
(0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (0.031)
Pre-reform V S
LIB
−V SLAB
V SLIB+V SLAB
-0.107 0.030 0.026 0.052
(0.030) (0.020) (0.039) (0.044)
Pre-reform V S
LAB
−V SCON
V SLAB+V SCON
-0.139 -0.076 0.159 0.057
(0.025) (0.022) (0.035) (0.037)
Pre-reform turnout 0.177 0.071 0.090 -0.338 0.171 0.152 0.006 -0.329 0.446 0.141 -0.132 -0.455
(0.120) (0.080) (0.154) (0.161) (0.143) (0.082) (0.185) (0.185) (0.136) (0.084) (0.139) (0.155)
Constant -0.228 -0.051 -0.074 0.353 -0.219 -0.097 -0.029 0.345 -0.388 -0.095 0.061 0.423
(0.081) (0.053) (0.093) (0.096) (0.093) (0.053) (0.111) (0.108) (0.091) (0.056) (0.083) (0.094)
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
R2 0.557 0.066 0.133 0.194 0.341 0.080 0.008 0.172 0.395 0.239 0.201 0.171
Note: The dependent variables are percentage point change in the vote-share from 1918 to 1921 for
the bloc given in the header. The sample is restricted to ‘SMDs’ where the three dominating blocs are
participating in all election years (N=42). In the pre-reform period we use first round vote-shares.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.5: Top-two reform analysis
Panel A: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3)
Lab. Lib. Con.
Reform1921 0.027 -0.030 0.025
(0.014) (0.015) (0.035)
[0.015] [0.012] [0.038]
Reform1921Xtop1918 -0.041 -0.122 -0.076
(0.018) (0.026) (0.041)
[0.020] [0.026] [0.040]
N 84 84 84
R2 0.094 0.638 0.128
SMD fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Control for entry of Farmers Party
(1) (2) (3)
Lab. Lib. Con.
Reform1921 0.044 -0.001 0.091
(0.018) (0.023) (0.047)
[0.018] [0.017] [0.047]
Reform1921Xtop1918 -0.041 -0.108 -0.099
(0.018) (0.024) (0.039)
[0.020] [0.025] [0.036]
Farmers Party running -0.026 -0.058 -0.078
(0.018) (0.027) (0.040)
[0.018] [0.026] [0.044]
N 84 84 84
R2 0.138 0.672 0.211
SMD fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the vote-share of the party bloc in the table header. The sam-
ple is restricted to ‘SMDs’ where the three dominating blocs are participating in all election years.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Cluster-robust standard errors based on the
post-reform district level in brackets (18 clusters).
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Table A.6: Top-two placebo analysis
Panel A: 1918 Placebo reform
(1) (2) (3)
Lab. Lib. Con.
Reform1918 0.023 -0.054 0.059
(0.017) (0.023) (0.029)
Reform1918Xtop1915 -0.031 -0.001 0.002
(0.020) (0.030) (0.035)
N 84 84 84
R2 0.073 0.215 0.321
SMD fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: 1915 Placebo reform
(1) (2) (3)
Lab. Lib. Con.
Reform1915 0.082 -0.018 -0.045
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020)
Reform1915Xtop1912 -0.041 0.003 -0.013
(0.014) (0.022) (0.027)
N 84 84 84
R2 0.708 0.034 0.319
SMD fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: 1912 Placebo reform
(1) (2) (3)
Lab. Lib. Con.
Reform1912 0.043 0.043 -0.026
(0.014) (0.030) (0.042)
Reform1912Xtop1909 -0.008 0.031 -0.060
(0.020) (0.034) (0.046)
N 84 84 84
R2 0.355 0.290 0.514
SMD fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the vote-share of the party bloc in the table header. The sample is
restricted to ‘SMDs’ where the three dominating blocs are participating in all election years. Cluster-
robust standard errors based on the post-reform district level in parentheses (18 clusters).
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